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 This work attempts to capture the critical issues plaguing Cuba’s continual economic 
dependency and suggests potential avenues for greater foreign direct investment. For the past 
year, I have been working to develop a framework to assess the current state of the Cuban 
economy in relation to foreign investment. However, I must acknowledge a few key 
limitations of my research. First, Cuba’s economic data is scarce and has often been criticized 
as unreliable or contradictory. Second, as Cuba operates a dual currency system, the actual 
cost and value of goods is difficult to calculate since the currencies trade at an artificial and 
fluctuating exchange rate. Third, bias of official reporting of Cuban economic studies and 
statistics is rampant and difficult to gauge: the Castro government has a long history of 
internal disagreement regarding the interpretation of official data.  This has resulted over the 
years in extremely divergent and even contradictory official economic analyses.  
In light of these limitations, I will utilize Cuba’s National Office of Information and 
Statistics’ annual reports as they provide the most informative reporting of economic data, 
albeit vague and difficult to interpret at times.  In addition, I will draw upon the economic 
reports published by the Center for the Study of the Cuban Economy, an influential policy 
center in Havana. During my research stint in Havana I had the opportunity to spend a week 
at the Center’s library and immerse myself in the current writings on the domestic economy, 
and I will include firsthand accounts of this experience.  Through a mix of first and 
secondhand accounts, I will provide an overview of the history of Cuban economic 
dependency, its implications, an assessment of the current reforms and the potential for future 
foreign investment in Cuba.  
I wish to express my sincere appreciation to the Center for the Study of Cuban 
Economy’s Director Dr. Omar Everleny for his hospitality and cordiality during my visit. I 





coordinated my independent study of the Cuban economy in Havana, and offered me ample 
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as the faculty advisor for this project. Dr. Bunck’s previous works on Fidel Castro and Cuba 
inspired my special interest in the Cuban economy, leading me to a research proposal that 
was the foundation of this thesis. In a similar vein, my time researching in Cuba would not 
have been possible without the financial support of various entities and people. I am grateful 
for Dr. Patricia Condon’s enthusiasm and support of my research and the generous funding 
awarded to me by the University of Louisville Honors Program through the Irvin F. and Alice 
S. Etscorn International Summer Research Award. I thank David and Betty Jones for their 
consistent promotion of a global education through generous funding initiatives. I would like 
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I.  Introduction 
 
After fifty years of governance within a closed economic system, Cuba has initiated a 
move to integrate into the world market.  With its current economy nearing complete 
bankruptcy, however, lingering international distrust, as a result of its complete 
nationalization without compensation of foreign and domestic businesses in the 1960s, and 
suspicion about the accuracy of the government’s current official economic statistics, many 
multinational businesses remain wary of investing significantly in Cuba. Moreover, the U.S. 
embargo against Cuba places major restrictions on the import and export of goods and limits 
most Americans from traveling to Cuba unless they have a legal purpose for doing so.   
While many adverse conditions still exist for foreign investment in Cuba, the island’s 
government has implemented a new foreign investment law that would greatly benefit 
multinational corporations and attempts to foster an environment of support for public-private 
partnerships.1  Since President Raul Castro has stated that he will not remain at the head of 
state for long, and Cuban leaders assume that the embargo will soon be lifted, government 
officials are scrambling to transition the economy in preparation for these events. In reaction 
to these realities, economists in Cuba and abroad have set out to create a framework for 
assessing Cuba’s economic future and to develop meaningful comparisons to other 
transitional economies.  The goal of these studies is to find an economic path that is both 
sustainable and effective.   
To begin, this paper will carefully assess the prospects of foreign investment in Cuba. 
Next, the paper presents a review of the relevant literature in the field of developmental and 
Caribbean economics.  Finally, the third section will present a historical overview of both 
Cuba’s long-enduring economic dependency and the more recent reforms of Raul Castro and 
                                                          





an analysis of the current economy in relation to the goals of the revolution. From this 
intensive historical and present-day study of the economy, the future prospects of the 
economy will be considered leading to in-depth examination of the advantages and 
disadvantages of foreign investment. A brief conclusion will summate this paper and close 
with a personal anecdote emblematic of Cuba’s future.  
 
II. Relevant Literature 
The Plantation Economy 
 
Lloyd Best and Kari Levitt’s Essays on the Theory of Plantation Economy develops a 
new conceptualization of the Caribbean economy.  Through of a series of complex case 
studies, the authors offer an ideological alternative to neo-liberalization and promote a 
different understanding of the Caribbean region. Their perspective of the plantation economy 
argues that the economies of Caribbean islands are fairly homogenous – detailing similarities 
among Cuba, Trinidad and Tobago, and the Dominican Republican – and lays out a system of 
reasoning for why the region should be viewed differently than the rest of the world.2 The 
theory of the plantation economy originates from the historically agricultural-based system 
reliant on slave labor, which was more lucrative for the investing state, Spain, than the 
domestic workers. The centuries of exploitation points to a systemic phenomenon that favors 
an imbalance of trade, creating an economic dependency model. The theory of plantation 
economy’s structural approach attempts to explain why the Caribbean islands “undergo 
alternating cycles of ‘boom’ and ‘bust’, why periods of boom are not self-sustaining, and why 
adjustment during the bust does not free the economy from dependence.”3   
                                                          
2 Best, Lloyd, and Kari Levitt. Essays on the Theory of Plantation Economy: A Historical and Institutional 
Approach to Caribbean Economic Development. Kingston, Jamaica: U of West Indies, 2009. 
3 Given, Norman. "The Plantation Economy in the Age of Globalization." Rpt. in Essays on the Theory of 





The plantation economy, in short, represents the foreign-owned and export-oriented 
sector, and key examples are agriculture, mining, and tourism. The link to both slavery and 
exploitation by the foreign sovereign can easily be found in all of these sectors, and until a 
Caribbean economy diminishes these areas and replaces them with residentiary sectors like 
manufacturing, foreign dependency will sharply characterize the economic fate of the island. 
In Best and Levitt’s interpretation, the theory of plantation economy does not embrace a 
fatalistic approach; instead it presents a method of re-conceptualizing the Caribbean 
structural approach to economics in order to explain the historical difficulties that these 
economically homogenous countries have faced as they attempt to modernize and become 
more independent and self-sufficient. Although the essays were written more than 50 years 
ago, the same issues are still present in Cuba. It has not advanced its residentiary sector, and 
it maintains a strong reliance on its plantation economy as the basis of an export-oriented, 
foreign-dependent economy.  Past examples of the adverse effects of this overreliance are 
plentiful.  
  Import-Substitution Industrialization 
 
 Related to the theory of plantation economy but more expansive in terms of regional 
and global inclusion, import-substitution industrialization is a structural approach to 
economics that attempts to explain what policies account for the difference between 
developed and developing nations. In other words, the import-substitution model addresses 
the systemic issues that lead to mass poverty in low-income nations.4  The long-term cause is 
generally linked to the dominance of agriculture or mining in an exploited country as opposed 
                                                          





to the diversified, service-based economy of an industrialized country.5  Linus Thomas’ 
review of Raul Prebisch’s economic development theory reinforces this root cause:  
A disproportionate amount of the benefits of technological progress seemed to accrue 
to the Center [developed countries] leaving the periphery [underdeveloped countries] 
with nothing but labor-intensive activities. Since labor is generally abundant in these 
economies, the rewards for technological improvements are very low in both 
production of the traditional goods and the emerging manufacturing industries.6  
 
Since the global economic paradigm concentrates technological and capital advancements in 
industrialized countries, low-income countries struggle to grow – only attracting industries 
that need inexpensive labor – and ultimately lack highly profitable manufacturing and 
service-based firms.7   
The theory suggests that these countries should invest in replacing imports by 
manufacturing them domestically and setting up trade barriers to protect these industries 
against the better established companies in high-income countries. After World War II, many 
countries of Latin America actively implemented state-sponsored policies of import-
substitution industrialization as they sought to escape the market volatility they suffered 
during the first half of the twentieth century and to avoid the devastating impact of another 
Great Depression.  Economic analyses, including critiques and reconsiderations of these 
policies have proliferated over the last several decades.8 
Common aspects of these essays support a few weaknesses and strengths of import-
substitution industrialization. In most cases, gross domestic product increased, but the growth 
                                                          
5 Ibid. 904. 
6 Thomas, Linus J.. “Neoclassical Development Theory and the Prebisch Doctrine: A Synthesis”. The American 
Economist 38.1 (1994): 77. 
7 Bruton, Henry J.. “A Reconsideration of Import Substitution”. Journal of Economic Literature 36.2 (1998): 904. 
8 Baer, Werner. “Import Substitution and Industrialization in Latin America: Experiences and 
Interpretations”. Latin American Research Review 7.1 (1972): 95–122. Bruton, Henry J.. “A Reconsideration of 
Import Substitution”. Journal of Economic Literature 36.2 (1998): 903–936. Thomas, Linus J.. “Neoclassical 
Development Theory and the Prebisch Doctrine: A Synthesis”. The American Economist 38.1 (1994): 75–81. 
Hirschman, Albert O. 1968. The Political Economy of Import-Substituting Industrialization in Latin 
America. Quarterly Journal of Economics 82, 1: 1–32. Krueger, Anne O. "Trade Policy as an Input to 





did not keep up with the accumulated foreign debt that was required to carry out these 
sweeping reforms and take on the various capital projects needed to make goods 
domestically. The import of needed capital goods alone often outweighed the profits made 
from the product.   In addition, the quality of domestically made goods were often well below 
international standards while their prices were well above.  The attempt by some countries to 
make automobiles demonstrates well this set of problems:  
A study by Baranson of automobile industries in developing countries (which includes 
information on Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico)… finds that among the main 
deficiencies are ‘… underdeveloped supplier capacities, inadequate quality control 
systems, and a dearth of qualified technicians and managers…’ Thus, Baranson found 
that many ‘… basic materials that are considered standard stock in open economies 
often must be procured locally or specially ordered in small batches at considerably 
higher cost or at inferior quality... Lack of uniformity in raw materials and semi-
finished goods such as castings and forgings creates special problems in milling and 
machining to required specifications. In high-volume production, precision and 
uniformity are built into automated equipment. Developing countries with limited 
markets are much more dependent upon the very machine labor skills in which they 
are deficient.’ Also, considering the many parts which go into an automobile, 
Baranson found that outside plant procurement averages about 60 per cent by value in 
advanced economies, while in countries like Mexico and Brazil this factor amounts to 
only 40 per cent. Such a condition further reduces the possibility of economies of 
large scale production. As a result, Baranson found that factory costs in Argentina, 
Brazil, and Mexico were about 60 per cent to 150 per cent higher than in the United 
States.9 
 
This evaluation of a specific sector yields critical data needed to surmise the usefulness of 
import-substitution industrialization. First, the automobile industry serves as a failed 
experiment of import-substitution, and from a cost perspective, it highlights the difficulty of 
competing with highly advanced countries and the importance of economies of scale. Closing 
the domestic economy by adding tariffs eliminates foreign competition, thereby, creating 
inefficiencies in the market. Moreover, as a country creates tariffs and prevents imports from 
flowing into the state, it simultaneously limits its economic potential for exports: “A country 
                                                          
9 Baer, Werner. “Import Substitution and Industrialization in Latin America: Experiences and 
Interpretations”.  Latin American Research Review 7.1 (1972): 104-105. 





that is closed for imports is closed for exports.”10  Although a negative for the global 
economy, protectionism in certain cases helps a developing country scale its production of a 
good in order to compete globally eventually.  
Another takeaway from the Latin American experience involves the importance of 
local raw materials and resources. Countries without the necessary raw materials for 
production must make trade deals to acquire them.  This reveals several key drawbacks.  
First, it makes the finished product susceptible to the volatile commodity prices of the 
intermediate goods. Second, the country requires proper supply-chain management in order 
to avoid major shortages and surpluses of raw materials. Third, the state needs scale to 
negotiate a better price for the raw material, or the cost will be too great to compete with 
advanced countries that receive or extract the materials for a much cheaper price. These 
lessons must be heeded for an import-substitution model to function properly. The Latin 
American example of import-substitution as a whole “was indiscriminate, that is, there were 
not attempts to concentrate on industrial sectors which might have had a potential 
comparative advantage.”11  Coupled with the economic shortages was widespread official 
corruption that resulted in the waste of a staggering of money and resources.  General 
widespread state mismanagement generally added to the failure.   
 
Comparative Advantage – Export Oriented Industrialization 
 
 The basis of comparative advantage relies on the principle that goods and services 
have factor intensities and are either capital-intensive or labor-intensive, and as such, a 
                                                          
10 Feinberg, Richard, and Ted Piccone. Cuba’s Economic Change in Comparative Perspective. Latin America 
Initiative Foreign Policy at Brookings, 2014: 73. 
11 Baer, Werner. “Import Substitution and Industrialization in Latin America: Experiences and 





particular location offers optimal production.12 As previously discussed, labor-intensive 
goods will generally become associated with poorer countries, and capital intensive-goods 
will gravitate toward advanced economies where capital is relatively cheaper. The theory of 
comparative advantage supports this simple distribution of production through the concept of 
specialization. The economics of trade strongly contradicts a state’s decision to leave the 
world market; comparative advantage, from a macro lens, shows that world production 
increases when states specialize. While states vary in the degree to which they become better 
off from specialization, every state’s economic production should expand as a result. Thus, an 
attempt by a state to become completely self-sustaining implies a contraction of its economic 
potential. Limiting integration with the global economy might lead to significant 
undervaluation of a state’s currency, and the state would be at a disadvantage if it needed 
foreign assistance or loans for investment projects. Additionally, the state would need to have 
ample raw materials and natural resources or an agreement to receive them. The scarcity of 
natural resources, along with random geographic allocation, presents a significant obstacle to 
a state that desires to build a self-sustaining economy. 
The developing countries that serve as representatives of successful transitions to a 
marked level of self-sufficiency tend to be the Southeast Asian countries.13 Protective legal 
barriers combined with foreign investment incentives, a commitment to export promotion, 
and disciplined, structured management, provided the right balance for the economic growth 
                                                          
12 Widodo, Tri. “Dynamic Comparative Advantages in the ASEAN+3”. Journal of Economic Integration 24.3 
(2009): 506. 
13 Widodo, Tri. “Dynamic Comparative Advantages in the ASEAN+3”. Journal of Economic Integration 24.3 
(2009): 505–529. Le, Quoc-Phuong. “Evaluating Vietnam's Changing Comparative Advantage Patterns”. ASEAN 
Economic Bulletin 27.2 (2010): 221–230. Bresnan, John. From Dominoes to Dynamos: The Transformation of 
Southeast Asia. New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1994. Frey, Marc, Ronald W. Pruessen, and Tai 
Yong. Tan. The Transformation of Southeast Asia: International Perspectives on Decolonization. Armonk, N.Y.: 
M.E. Sharpe, 2003. Jomo K. S. Southeast Asia's Industrialization: Industrial Policy, Capabilities, and 
Sustainability. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave, 2001. Machikita, Tomohiro, and Yasushi Ueki. 
"Measuring and Explaining Innovative Capability: Evidence from Southeast Asia." Asian Economic Policy 





that these Southeast Asian countries sustained during the late-1900s.  Through careful and 
thoughtful planning, a diversified economy that invested in sectors associated with strong 
comparative advantages, and scrupulous debt accumulation, these countries became advanced 
industrialized nations and serve as models for other developing countries.  
Economists have carefully studied the economic transitions of Southeast Asian countries and 
have found Vietnam to be a potential model of reform for Cuba.14 Kanako Yamaoka makes 
the comparison to suggest that a transition to a market-based economy is possible in an 
autocratic regime.15  In No More Free Lunch: Reflections on the Cuban Economic Reform 
Process and Challenges for Transformation, Pavel Vidal, Omar Everleny and Claes 
Brundenius and Doanh Le Dang have all contributed articles on comparisons of Cuba to 
Vietnam. Pavel Vidal emphasizes the monetary and financial similarities to Vietnam, and 
Omar Everleny connects the foreign direct investment prospects to Vietnam’s successful 
transition. Meanwhile Claes Brundenius and Doanh Le Dang focus on entrepreneurship and 
small enterprises in relation to Vietnam. Pavel Vidal and Omar Everleny are prolific 
economic-policy experts and scholars at the influential Center for the Study of the Cuban 
Economy, and their conscious decision to model Cuba’s transition after Vietnam suggests 
that future policy decisions will consider Vietnam’s economic past. A critique of the 
comparison might argue that the economies are not that similar; for example, “In 1990 
Vietnam’s was greater than 40%. By 2012 Vietnam’s [share had fallen] to 19.3%. By 
contrast, Cuba’s share of GDP in 2012 was 3.8%.16 In this sense, the distribution of GDP and 
                                                          
14 Brundenius, Claes, and Pérez R. Torres. No More Free Lunch: Reflections on the Cuban Economic Reform 
Process and Challenges for Transformation. 2013: 63-82, 129-151, & 173-192. 
15 Yamaoka, Kanako. The Feasibility of Cuban Market Economy: A Comparison with Vietnam. Issue brief no. 
189. Chiba-Shi Chia Japan: Institute of Developing Economies. Yamaoka, Kanako. Comparison of Two 
Remaining Socialist Countries-Cuba and Vietnam: Possibility of Economic Reform in a Socialist Society and Its 
Possible Impact. Issue brief no. 07–15. Cambridge, MA: Program on U.S.-Japan Relations, Harvard University, 
2007. 
16  Betancourt, Roger. “Cuba 2014: A Different Perspective on Cuba’s “Structural” Reforms. Association for the 






agricultural dependence greatly differs between the two countries, yet that distinction does 
not merit ignoring Vietnam as a model – only it suggests a reasonable framing for how to 
view Cuba in the context of the Vietnamese transformation.  
 
Foreign Direct Investment - Trust 
 
 The theory of plantation economy, import-substitution industrialization and export-
orientated industrialization all address the policies that a central government should 
implement in order to promote economic growth. A tool that these policies use is foreign 
direct investment. Foreign direct investment is “the creation or expansion of firms that 
operate across borders.”17 This expansion of firms does not always leave a net benefit on the 
economy, and therefore, the state should exercise a modest degree of discretion in shaping a 
trade policy to ward off net negative foreign investments.18  Economists disagree on the 
premise behind foreign direct investment. One school of thought assumes that “highly 
competitive, profit-maximizing firms [seek] to minimize their costs of production.”19 
Economists who argue against that assumption generally view foreign direct investment as a 
way firms “(1) capture monopoly profits abroad… and/or (2) maintain market positions 
abroad as alternative suppliers in the local market itself and in other foreign countries to 
become more competitive.”20 Understanding the underlying reason behind a firm’s decision 
gives a host country a better chance of attracting foreign direct investment: 
Direct investment should be thought of primarily as an issue in industrial 
organization, not in capital flow. That is, analysis should focus more on the reasons 
                                                          
17 Froot, Kenneth. Foreign Direct Investment. Chicago: U of Chicago, 1993: 21. 
18 Feinberg, Richard E. The New Cuban Economy: What Roles for Foreign Investment? Washington, DC: 
Brookings Institution, 2012: 3. 
19 Ray, Edward John. “Foreign Direct Investment in Manufacturing”. Journal of Political Economy 85.2 (1977): 
284. 





why multinational firms exist and have advantages than on the international flows of 
money per se.21 
 
Although trade and foreign investments are generally viewed by the imports and exports of a 
country or its trade balance or imbalance, the necessary component – in terms of analysis – is 
the industrial organization. Control over the manufacturing and operations (or the 
contracting) of a domestic company poses a difficult choice for firms; however, according to 
Kenneth Froot, control over the investment creates a more efficient operation.22  Cuba’s joint-
ventures, therefore, might lead to small inefficiencies, but the domestic profit will generally 
offset the loss of production. Economic gains of foreign-direct investment for a host country 
include income tax and indirect benefits to the private sector through spill-overs of 
productivity.23 The likelihood of foreign direct investment increases in industries that consist 
of corporations with strong financial moats: “Where products are differentiated, reputation is 
vital, and technology is firm specific and constantly improving.”24 While other companies 
and industries might be targets of foreign investment, the majority of firms will have 
common links to the previous industry description. A concern of host countries about foreign 
direct investment considers how well domestic companies can compete with foreign 
subsidiaries. Drawing upon examples from Japan, China and Korea, scholars have shown that 
these countries had rigid investment laws that helped protect their local businesses, giving 
them time to increase production.25 As for the difficulty of attracting investment, firms 
require a concrete reason why they should make foreign investments in a country as opposed 
to simply trading with that country: 
Direct invest investment will be chosen instead of, or adjunct to, trade only to the 
extent that the location offers a substantial advantage to the company. This advantage 
may result from the unusual comparative advantage as reflected in lower production 
                                                          
21 Froot, Kenneth. Foreign Direct Investment. Chicago: U of Chicago, 1993: 29. 
22 Ibid 1. 
23 Caves, Richard E.. “Multinational Firms, Competition, and Productivity in Host-country 
Markets”.Economica 41.162 (1974): 177. 
24Froot, Kenneth. Foreign Direct Investment. Chicago: U of Chicago, 1993: 40.  





costs. Barriers to imports or other host-country policy inducements also play a role in 
determining the most advantageous location for production.26 
 
In this context, Cuba has strengths for attracting foreign direct investment in three different 
categories; 1) its natural resources including mining, potential oil reserves, and its tropical 
environment; 2) its highly educated population helps differentiate Cuba’s human capital 
especially at its lower relative wages; and 3) Cuba’s market is fairly closed to external agents, 
making corporations more apt to attempt to penetrate the market.27   
Cuba faces extra obstacles as it attempts to seek out foreign direct investment. Over 
the past fifty years, Cuba has acted in bad faith in a variety of ways including the 
expropriation of U.S. businesses and the false reporting of its economic data.28 As such, trust 
becomes relevant to the discussion of a firm’s willingness to invest in Cuba. Fukuyama 
defines trust as “the expectation that arises within a community of regular, honest, and 
cooperative behavior, based on commonly shared norms, on the part of other members of the 
community.”29 
In relation to trust, Fukuyama prescribes social capital as “a capability that arises from the 
prevalence of trust in a society.30 States or actors evaluate the social capital of others through 
cultural tendencies like historical precedent. Thus, a historical economic review becomes 
critical to the evaluation of a country’s ability to attract foreign direct investment. Once trust 
has been lost in a society, it is very difficult to regain: 
Social capital is like a ratchet that is more easily turned in one direction than another; 
it can be dissipated by the actions of governments much more readily than those 
governments can build it up again.31 
 
                                                          
26 Froot, Kenneth. Foreign Direct Investment. Chicago: U of Chicago, 1993: 40-41. 
27 Feinberg, Richard E. The New Cuban Economy: What Roles for Foreign Investment? Washington, DC: 
Brookings Institution, 2012: 15. 
28 Ibid 19. 
29 Fukuyama, Francis. Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity. New York: Free, 1995: 26. 
30 Ibid 26. 





The lack of social capital makes an investment in Cuba less appealing, and as such, a higher 
risk premium must be applied. Since Cuba’s growth potential is high and most of its land 
remains untapped, the effect of minimal social capital is rather limited. However, if the 
Cuban government continues to expropriate land, cancel contracts, and make foreign 
investing difficult, the trust factor’s relative importance will rise exponentially. Even if a 
democratic transition takes place, simultaneous capitalistic reforms must also occur in order 
to maintain a democratic order and reestablish trust.32 Fukuyama prescribes these capitalistic 
reforms as necessary because they help create “firms, entrepreneurs, markets and 
competition” through the development of capitalistic institutions, and he points to the 
difficulties that the Eastern European countries faced as they attempted to transition into 
democracies after the fall of Soviet Union.33 Cuba diverges from these historical examples in 
this regard, however.34  
 Fukuyama’s overall theory of trust does provide a lens through which to see Cuba: 
“Low-trust societies, by contrast, must fence in and isolate their workers with a series of 
bureaucratic rules.”35 This principle directly reflects the treatment of workers for roughly 20 
companies starting in the 1980s and continuing up until Raul came to power. Fukuyama, a 
staunch proponent of capitalism who proclaimed the “unabashed victory of economic and 
political liberalism,” suggests that a low-trust society needs “a more intrusive, rule-making 
government to regulate social relations.”36 In that sense, a state-controlled economy has its 
advantages domestically and internationally when it has a history of actions that jeopardizes 
                                                          
32 Ibid 356. 
33 Ibid 356. 
34 Ritter, Archibald R., Ted Henken. Entrepreneurial Cuba: The Changing Policy Landscape. First Forum Press, 
11/2014.  
35 Fukuyama, Francis. Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity. New York: Free, 1995: 28. 
36 Fukuyama, Francis. “The End of History?” The National Interest 16 (1989): 3. 





its social capital. The disadvantages of a command economy with low social capital are that 
most of its companies will be inefficient and corruption will rise.37  
 Political risk also plays a critical role in the pursuit of foreign direct investment since 
“The absence of supranational courts limits legal remedies and where an investor’s foreign 
nationality limits redress through domestic political institutions.”38 In Cuba, the government 
controls both the courts and the institutions, and the centralization of power allows most of 
the decisions to be made a higher level, creating significant political risk.  Article 60 of the 
2014 Foreign Investment Act explains the process of settling disputes, and it essentially vests 
all the power into the Economic Division of the particular Provincial People’s Court.39 An 
illustration of the significance of this section involves the right to terminate or renew a 
contract. If the government decides that a foreign corporation has violated a section of the 
foreign investment contract, the contract can be terminated, and the only legal remedy the 
corporation has is to appeal the termination to the provincial court, which is an extension of 
the government. Thus, the final decision will not be made by a neutral, third party.  
Political risk also includes the historical acts of the government.  The determination of 
the sustained impact of past acts of expropriation and default play a key role in calculating 
the political risk associated with investments in Cuba. While a company that has had its 
assets expropriated would most likely avoid future investment, other companies that were not 
directly affected by past acts of expropriation would still consider investment as long as the 
reward was worth the incentive. Cuba offers a completely new market for investors, and as 
such, the island compels foreign companies to invest in its potential. The financial 
implications of the current United States sponsored embargo discourages firms from 
                                                          
37 Fukuyama, Francis. Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity. New York: Free, 1995: 358. 
38 Tomz, Michael, and Mark L. J. Wright. "Sovereign Theft: Theory and Evidence about Sovereign Default and 
Expropriation." 2008: 69. 






investing in Cuba; however, once the government lifts it, companies will be more likely to try 
and penetrate the Cuban market. The next political transition will have a tremendous effect 
on the risk associated with investment. When Raul Castro steps down, his successor will 
create a new perspective from which to judge the trustworthiness of investment. If risk 
averse, the leader will be motivated to expropriate foreign assets in bad times; however, if the 
next president does not fear risk, he or she might be willing to centralize foreign investment 
in good times in order to fortify power and control.40 These considerations should be 
carefully evaluated by companies looking to invest, and as such, the successor should work to 
establish a reputation of trust and ethical behavior.  
 This literature review suggests a few economic principles that will guide the analysis 
of Cuba’s foreign investment prospects. First, Cuba must build its residentiary sector, but the 
focus should be on only areas of comparative advantage. Protective laws and barriers are 
required to stabilize economic transition and prevent a resurgence of economic dependence. 
Strategic planning by the state sector needs to be implemented in order to create incentives 
for foreign investment and growth. Diversification is necessary; however, the diversity of 
exports should be limited to the fields of comparative advantage. Cuba must build its social 
capital. It must select an economic model that promotes the market and allows firms and 
entrepreneurs to thrive.  
Moreover, after making its selection, Cuba must maintain its course. Cuba has a long 
history of reversing its trajectory, often relying more on idealism and less on a sound plan.  
This next economic policy must be grounded in reality, and the government must show how 
the revenue totals more than cost. To the outside world, Cuba must project a new self: a 
country that cares about its international image. It must make timely payments on its debt, 
                                                          
40 Tomz, Michael, and Mark L. J. Wright. "Sovereign Theft: Theory and Evidence about Sovereign Default and 





eliminate its dual currency system. and join the modern world. Cuba must embrace its highly 
educated population and attract investment that focuses on work that needs highly educated 
labor. In addition, Cuba must develop methods to keep this population from leaving; without 
its sharpest minds, Cuba will be at a major disadvantage as it reintegrates into the world 
economy. While this study has primarily addresses the external sector, the social capital must 
also be improved domestically in order to advance the quality of life of citizens.  One of the 
best options for improving the standard of living is by promoting entrepreneurship and 
removing the barriers to entry.   
Cuba must reexamine the progress it has made on its revolutionary goals. Through its 
platform of growth with equity, Cuba has expanded the literacy rate, improved public 
schooling, and advanced the healthcare sector. The next economy policy must account for 
these gains, and economic growth should only be pursued when it does not force the 
government to sacrifice these achievements or the equity that was created throughout the 
second half of the twentieth century. 
 
III. Historical Overview of Cuban Economic Dependency 
 
For the past 500 years Cuba has struggled to be self-sufficient and independent, and it 
has a complex history of economic dependency and monoculture exportation. During the 
early history of Cuba after its discovery by Spain, the small native population was nearly 
exterminated, and thus, the Spaniards created a two- class system or plantation system, which 
consisted of a wealthy land-owing elite and a slave class.  Since the native population had 
almost totally perished as a result of disease and conquest, the Spanish had to import a huge 
population of African slaves.  Present-day Cuban culture and ethnicity can be traced back to 





Spain exported Cuban sugar all over the world, and by 1856 Cuban sugar dominated the 
world market accounting for 25 percent of global sugar.41 This stratified system of Spanish 
mercantilism essentially remained in place until the end of the nineteenth century. It 
weakened slightly in 1884, however, when the world price of sugar dropped significantly, 
forcing many sugar mills to declare bankruptcy.42 Seeing an investment opportunity, U.S. 
firms poured millions of dollars into the Cuba’s sugar industry, cementing Cuba’s relations 
with the United States. Finally, after nearly three decades of resistance against Spanish 
ownership, the Cubans gained their independence in 1898 with U.S. assistance.  While Cuba 
legally gained full independence, it nevertheless remained heavily tied to the U.S. economy 
and enjoyed little authentic economic independence.   
In the late 1950s Fidel Castro led a revolt against the American-supported military 
dictatorship of Fulgencio Batista.  Revolution promised true independence and the end of 
Cuban reliance on the United States. Following the revolution, the Cuban economy followed 
cyclical transitions as the command economy made various attempts to stimulate growth and 
maintain equity. Carmelo Mesa-Lago and Jorge Perez-Lopez breakdown the period from 
1959 to 2012 into eight distinct cycles: 
1959–1966: Although difficult to classify, this was mostly an idealist cycle, with 
some facets of pragmatism particularly in 1964–1966; this period is divided into three 
subcycles: market erosion, introduction of orthodox Soviet central planning, and 
debate over socialist models.  
 
1966–1970: Fidel’s adoption and radicalization of the Guevarist model, a strong 
idealist cycle.  
 
1971–1985: Total collapse of the Cuban economy and the introduction of the Soviet 
timid (pre-Gorbachev) economic reform model, the first well-identified pragmatist 
cycle.  
 
1986–1990: The so-called Rectification Process, the third idealist cycle. 
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1991–1996: Crisis and market-oriented reforms, the second and strongest pragmatist 
cycle up to this point, under the “Special Period in Time of Peace.”  
 
1997–2003: Slowdown and halt of the reform, a cycle of policy stagnation.  
 
2003–2006: Reversal of reforms, the fourth idealist cycle, although weaker than 
previous idealist cycles. 
 
2007–present: Raúl Castro’s structural reforms, the third and strongest pragmatist 
cycle of the revolution.43  
 
This 50-year period of abrupt shifts in policy direction and subsequent reforms underlie a 
critical set of contradictions with which the Cuban leadership has continually struggled.   The 
government has failed to find the right balance of economic reforms to bolster the economy, 
and when changes have actually begun to work, the subsequent diminishing of ideological 
fervor throughout the country have consistently prompted the government to implement often 
sweeping policy reverses, eliminating the gains from the previous cycle. A more detailed 
review illuminates this challenge. 
  
First Cycle: Post-Revolution and State-Centralization 1959-1966 
 
Between 1959 and 1962, Castro implemented various changes like the nationalization 
of U.S. businesses and agrarian land reform, which further solidified Cuba’s economic break 
from the U.S.  Castro seized hundreds of millions of dollars of capital from American 
businesses, filling the government’s coffers and delivering tremendous potential for state 
production. As a way of determining the value of the expropriation and providing a legal 
channel to regain losses, the United States government established the Cuban Claims 
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Program in 1964 as an extension of the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, and the 
Cuban Claims Program met between 1966 and 1972: 
During that time, it received 8,816 claims: 1,146 by U.S. corporations and 7,670 by 
individual U.S. citizens. It certified 5,911 of these claims, with an aggregate amount 
of $1.8 billion; denied 1,195 claims, with an aggregate amount of $1.5 billion; and 
dismissed without consideration (or saw withdrawn) 1,710 other claims.44  
 
This $1.8 billion dollars of certified claims does not include interest and represents a fair 
market value estimate of the amount of seized property claimed by the Cuban government. 
These claims still remain active today although many of the companies no longer exist or 
have been absorbed into different corporations. The vast accumulation of wealth provided a 
major advantage to a government that desired to transition to a state-planning model.   
In 1962, in response to Cuba’s move to establish far-reaching trade arrangements with 
the Soviet bloc and its attempt to place Soviet missiles on the island, President Kennedy 
declared an executive directive that forbade U.S. commerce with Cuba and prohibited Cuban 
imports. These restrictions placed extensive pressure on the Cuban economy, and Castro 
quickly turned to the Soviet Union for aid. As the United States retreated from Cuba, the 
Soviet Union increased its presence. Besides the $1.8 billion in expropriations, the Cuban 
government also received a substantial post-revolution advantage through Soviet credits, 
approximately $600 million during the period of 1959-1963.45  Fifty percent of these credits 
helped finance economic development, while the other half was primarily focused on 
assisting Cuba with fulfilling its trade agreements with the Soviet Union.46 Over the same 
time period, other communist states offered another $157 million in credits, expanding the 
development on the island.47 This source of financial credits serves as another component of 
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Cuba’s advantage as it embarked on establishing a new economic plan. Limiting the analysis 
of how these credits were utilized is the fact that “it is particularly difficult to evaluate the 
quality of Soviet aid to Cuba because of the paucity of materials on the subject.”48  However, 
with that acknowledged, the available information still allows an informed judgment on 
governmental policies of the first cycle.  
Cuba attempted to model its economic transition after Czechoslovakia, purchasing 
industrial equipment from the country.  Che Guevara spent time in Eastern Europe studying 
its economic functions and manufacturing capabilities, and upon his return to Cuba, he set out 
an ambitious task of diversification and import-substitution industrialization. While plans 
were drawn, they were somewhat haphazard as reforms were instituted almost impulsively.49 
The agrarian land reform and diversification of crops yielded unexpected downturns in the 
sugar industry.50  The idealism and raw ambition combined in an attempt to overhaul 
completely a capitalistic society into a state-controlled command economy. Interestingly 
enough, Castro disagreed with the communist model favoring a less intense socialist model. 
Nevertheless, whatever model the government found preferential did not endure.  
The failure of the early transition of the economy was four-fold. First, the economic 
plan was rough, vague, and even non-existent in some areas. Second, the Czech model was a 
poor fit for Cuba, and following its manufacturing strategies did not promote the growth that 
the leaders expected. Third, the forced transition of the agricultural sector away from sugar 
and the rapid collectivization of land lacked stability and foresight, leading to significant 
declines in sugar production – the main export of the time. Fourth, the Cuban government’s 
political differences with the United States and its desire for equitable wealth distribution 
created a mass exodus of managers and business leaders whose talent was needed during the 
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transition. Although the fourth reason was not in the control of the Cuban government, the 
other three factors could have been prevented with better planning.  
Moreover, the economic difficulties associated with the first cycle are deeply 
connected to the ideological and idealistic aspects of the revolution. Connecting these early 
years to the beginning of the Cuban revolution reveals a parallel that defines Fidel Castro 
during this time period. During Fidel Castro’s time in Mexico as an exile from Cuba, he met 
Che Guevara, and together, the men plotted the overthrow of Batista. The plan consisted of 
sailing an 82-man company aboard a yacht the revolutionaries called Granma to Cuba and 
meeting up with local sympathizers to start the revolution. Batista’s men killed 75 percent of 
the Granma rebels when they landed, decimating any chance Castro had of consolidating 
support. This idealism and their wholly unrealistic expectations illustrate the way in which 
these two revolutionary leaders thought.  Luck alone and the loss of morale among Batista’s 
army explains more about revolutionary victory than any other set of factors.  The utter lack 
of a realistic, grounded understanding of economics helps to explain why their revolutionary 
economic transformations failed during the early 1960s.  
After the unsuccessful first sub-cycle, a deliberative movement back to the 
monoculture export of sugar occurred. In 1961, sugar production totaled 6.7 million tons, but 
by 1964, total production had decreased to 3.8 million tons, a 43% reduction in output.51 
Realizing the policies were unsustainable, Fidel Castro famously proclaimed that Cuba would 
ramp up sugar production to 10 million tons by 1970 – a complete departure from the 
revolutionary goal of economic diversification.52 At the same time, the influential inner circle 
of Cuban politics diverged on strategy: one group favored a socialist transformation, and the 
other leaders, inclusive of Che, supported an idealistic communist state of affairs. Ultimately, 
                                                          






in 1965, Che Guevara left Cuba to join in another revolution, leaving Fidel full power of 
economic decision-making.  
Second Cycle: Export-Oriented  
 
 Now solely responsible for the economy, Castro introduced a new strategy of 
concentrating on sugar production. Unfortunately, the increase in production barely surpassed 
the production levels of 1961, and by 1970, Cuba only reached 8.5 million tons, 15 percent 
less than its forecasted goal and barely above the sugar-production levels of the 1950s.   
Moreover, it represents less than a 3 percent annual growth rate of sugar production during 
the 1960s. Therefore, it was actually a rather small feat of economic capability, particularly 
given that the regime focused all of its attention and energy on this goal.  Although less 
impressive with further analysis, the policy change did expand sugar production 2.5 times 
from 1964-1970, illustrating, in part, the strength of export promotion.  
In addition to the government’s change in focus, this period also marshaled in a new 
method of economic planning. Castro articulated a new vision that incorporated Che 
Guevara’s plan with his own personal philosophy, allowing him to consolidate power and 
control.53  Castro delivered a series of speeches in which called on Cubans to combine the 
institutional changes already in place with a revolutionary transformation of culture.  He 
implored each Cuban man to change the way he thinks about himself and to become “a new 
man” that would volunteer his time and labor selflessly for the revolution. Fidel offered 
moral incentives to men who followed their leader unquestioningly and worked hard and 
sacrificed for the spirit of the revolution.  Many Cubans rallied behind their charismatic 
leader.  Seeing the potential for an egalitarian society, the government expropriated close to 
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60,000 small enterprises and rid the society of family farm collectives, reorganizing the entire 
population around the public sector.54  In this idealism, Fidel developed a new economic 
policy of socialism and communism combined.  It did not last long, however, as the economy 
quickly began to disintegrate. 
Third and Fourth Cycles: Soviet Dependency 
Adverse conditions that culminated in widespread economic crises pressured the 
Cuban government to seek additional help from the Soviet Union, fully shifting Cuba’s 
relationship with the Soviet Union to one of dependency.  This new – and more extensive – 
relationship of dependency sustained for 20 more years.  While the relationship prominently 
consisted of trade, geopolitical factors, and Cuban support of Soviet expansionism and 
communist rebellions around the world helped maintain the amicable nature of the deal. In 
1972 the Soviet Union granted Cuba membership in the Council for Mutual Economic 
Assistance (CMEA).55  In this expanded trade role, the Soviet Union readily gave billions of 
dollars of aid to Cuba. As Figure 1 suggests below, Cuban trade with communist countries 
exploded after 1972, tripling its exports in 2 years. Such a drastic transformation shows the 
direct impact of Cuba’s integration into the CMEA, and it suggests an improvement in 
economic production: “Economic growth recorded the highest average annual rate, 
particularly in 1971-1975, spurred by historically high world market prices for sugar.”56 On 
the opposite side of this success, the Cuban government decided to invest heavily in its 
production in order to export sugar to other countries.  By the time the capital had been spent, 
however, the market price of sugar plummeted, making the economic conditions worse for 
Cuba. 
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Discrepancies in the economic data of Cuba’s external sector during this time period provide 
the need for verification of statistics. Figure 1 comes from a sub-committee hearing of the 
United States Congress. The table has been combined with a table from Cuba’s National 
Office of Statistics in order to determine validity (See Figure 2). The years 1950, 1955, 1960, 
1965, 1970, and 1975 are taken from the Annual Report of the External Sector of the Cuban 
Economy, which is published by the Cuban National Office of Statistics. The value of the 
imports and exports are in millions of pesos. The years 1957, 1968, 1970, 1972, 1974, and 
1975** are from Figure 1, which comes from a United States congressional subcommittee, 
and the values are in millions of dollars. When amalgamating the tables, the 1970 values 
were identical, leading to a conclusion that the measurement of pesos accurately reflects U.S. 
dollars.  At the time, the convertible peso did not exist, and the exchange rate between local 
pesos and convertible pesos fluctuated; therefore, without comparison, that data requires 
extra scrutiny.  The exact match shows that there is not a problem with that year and most 
likely can be generalized to the whole.  Unfortunately, the 1975 preliminary exports and 
imports do not align with the data from the Office of National Statistics. Since the 
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subcommittee report occurred in 1976, this difference might have been corrected following 
that meeting. Nonetheless, this discrepancy serves as an anecdotal evidence of the difficulties 





The CMEA helped Cuba escape its trade deficiency through augmented prices and 
larger export deals.  These major advancements in the Cuban economy posit the question: 
Why did Cuba not receive admission to the CMEA prior to 1972? The Soviet Union had 
considered this possibility back in 1960 at the very beginning of Castro’s anti-American 
rhetoric and policies. Among the communiques sent out by the Soviet Union during 1960 was 
a report to Czechoslovakia about the upcoming visit by Che Guevara.59  In the report, the 
Soviet Union had a direct recommendation to Czechoslovakia if Che Guevara asked about 
Cuba’s prospects of joining CMEA: 
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Years Exports Imports Net Exports
1950 642 515 127
1955 594 575 19
1957 818 895 -77
1960 608 580 28
1965 691 866 -175
1968 652 1103 -451
1970* 1050 1311 -261
1972 840 1297 -457
1974 2689 2693 -4
1975 2952 3113 -161
1975** 3415 3805 -390





A decision can be made only after consultations with all member countries of the 
CMEA; Inform Mr. Guevara about the conditions for membership in the CMEA, 
which are based on an accepted Statute of the CMEA. Emphasize that based on this 
accepted Statute of the CMEA, only European countries may become members of the 
Council, and that other countries can participate in the work of the Council for Mutual 
Economic Assistance on selected issues. Inform Mr. Guevara about the main 
objectives of the CMEA, namely coordination of plans for the next 20 years.60 
 
 
This report reflects the Soviet mindset toward the CMEA in 1960, and while its official 
stance was to restrict the CMEA to European states, the Soviet Union still advocated for a 
broad partnership with Cuba and asked the Czechoslovak trade representatives to assist in the 
financing of Cuban development. However, Che, in fact, did not specifically request 
membership in the CMEA because at that time the Cuban government still hoped to be able 
to broadly diversify its trade relationships beyond the Soviet bloc.  Moreover, a few political 
disagreements, including the Soviet decision to remove the missiles from Cuba without 
informing Fidel Castro, prolonged the time period before the Soviet Union finally admitted 
Cuba into the CMEA. Without these political differences, the Cuba government might have 
prospered much earlier, and speculatively, the economy might have been in a better position 
to withstand the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s.  
 The trade benefits from the CMEA were substantial; however, Soviet aid outpaced 
those benefits. Figure 3 compares the aid given to Cuba to the aid received by Vietnam. This 
significant difference underscores the high value of Cuba’s geopolitical location and its 
degree of dependency.  A closer observation reveals that the Vietnamese invested their aid in 
rapidly expanding sectors that produced prosperity while the Cubans failed to invest at all in 
sectors that produced growth.  In fact, economists have confirmed that much of the Soviet aid 
was never invested in the economy at all.  Certainly it was not invested in an effort to 
enhance economic self-sufficiency.  
                                                          








While difficult to quantify, the Soviet subsidies amounted to approximately $25 
billion in aid between 1965 and 1980. The principle methods for these subsidies occurred 
through the exchange of oil, nickel and sugar. In 1975 the Soviet bloc purchased sugar from 
Cuba at $0.50 per pound, while the world market price of sugar hovered at around $0.05 per 
pound. At its peak, Cuba produced almost 10 million tons of sugar annually, which would 
equate to a subsidy of almost $9 billion.  This drastic overpayment for sugar describes one 
method the Soviet Union subsidized the Castro government. Real issues developed from the 
rich amounts of aid that the Soviet Union gave to Cuba. First, the cost of production became 
distorted. Since the Soviet Union paid a premium above the world sugar price, Cuba did not 
have to compete with the price and quality of the rest of the world, leading to lags in 
production.  Second, the Soviet Union sold oil to the Cubans at well below the world price.  
The re-exporting of oil on the world market amounted to one of the island’s top hard-
currency earners.  Cuba became accustomed to re-exporting oil that it did not consume.62 
This reliance on re-exportation created a high degree of dependency because the profit 
depended on aid.  
 
                                                          
61 Yamaoka, Kanako. Comparison of Two Remaining Socialist Countries-Cuba and Vietnam: Possibility of 
Economic Reform in a Socialist Society and Its Possible Impact. Issue brief no. 07–15. Cambridge, MA: Program 
on U.S.-Japan Relations, Harvard University, 2007. [citing CIA Handbook]. 
62 Mesa-Lago, Carmelo, Jorge Pérez-López. Cuba Under Raúl Castro: Assessing the Reforms, 1st Edition. Lynne 





Fifth and Sixth Cycles: Special Period in Time of Peace and Restructuring 
 
 After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the tightening of the U.S. embargo 
in 1996, Cuba became independent of influence with the exception of the negative pressure 
from the embargo.  The economies of the European Union and Latin America distanced 
themselves from the Cuban crisis, and the island faced extreme economic perils. 
Characterized as the Special Period in Time of Peace, poverty rates skyrocketed, and 
economic production virtually stopped. For the first time in its history, Cuba had finally 
achieved independence, and its economy was rapidly collapsing.  Castro worked to motivate 
Cubans to work without wage in order to fulfill the ideals of the revolution, and he labeled 
these years as the “special period,” which he insisted would, through hard work, lead to 
economic prosperity. He revitalized his call to each Cuban to become the “new man” and 
offered moral incentives in lieu of salaries.  
While the Spanish, American and Soviet periods have been addressed, the past 25 
years also support the idea that the Cubans turned to other countries to make the investments. 
Castro actively sought out international partners during the Special Period, and he leveraged 
his shared socialist virtues with newly transitioning Latin American states.  This connection 
led to a lucrative partnership with Venezuela. Through a creative deal, Cuba exchanged 
doctors for oil and then took a hefty cut of the doctors’ wages to fund the government. The 
government opened its poorly performing industries to foreign investment and attracted 
Canadian’s Sherritt Corporation to modernize its nickel mining industry.  
 






Since gaining office in 2006 Raul Castro has initiated a new phase.  Accelerating 
privatization, that began out of necessity in the 1990s, revising foreign investment laws, and 
expanding tourism has strengthened the economy slightly.  His announcement that he plans to 
step down in 2018 has stimulated more reforms, which has helped to build domestic 
confidence in the government.  Cuba’s long pre-revolutionary tradition of being highly 
entrepreneurial and productive, economists hope, will contribute to the current effort to 
recover.  One of Cuba’s most valuable sources of hard currency is its export of human 
capital.  The government has for years sent abroad doctors, coaches and trainers, and other 
professionals to serve the needs of other countries.  The government is paid for these 
services, and it pays the professionals the going wage in Cuba.  Another significant source of 
hard currency in Cuba are remittances sent to Cuba from Cubans and Cuban-Americans 
living in the United States.  The third most profitable sector is tourism. All three of these 
economic sectors depend on an international flow of goods and services.  The government 
continues to struggle to attract investment and draw on the global supply of goods and 
services, while avoiding the creation of another highly dependent economic relationship.  
This historical context provides the framework for assessing the Cuban economic model and 
the necessary economic changes. 
The bewildering issue that continues to plague Cuba is its inefficiency and lack of 
production. After extensive analyses of the Cuba economy, economists have found that 3 
percent of government corporations accounted for 75 percent of the state’s profit. This 
revelation remained shrouded by the dual currency system, which allowed state enterprises to 
veil their profit margins and losses.  By 2016, the government hoped to transition 2 million 
people to non-state sectors, roughly 40 percent of the labor force.63 However, in 2014, only 
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600,000 workers had been restructured to the private sector. Unfortunately, the movement of 
workers to entrepreneurship did not yield the expected results: “Whereas the global average 
is for one self-employed to employ five others, the situation in Cuba is completely the 
opposite (only one out of five creating one additional job).”64 If Cuba had followed the global 
average, there would already be 2.5 million people working in private enterprises; however, 
the stifling taxes, licensing fees, and mistrust of the government have prevented this growth. 
In a way, this reflects Cuba’s poor social capital as it is unable to create new jobs at the same 
rate as other comparable countries.  
 Besides simply transitioning workers from the state sector, the government must also 
address the inefficiencies and corruption found in state enterprises; for example, in 2008, the 
Ministry of Labor and Social Security through an in-depth survey found that almost 50 
percent of state employees were arriving to work late.65  The deeply rooted and systemic 
problem of inefficiency highlights how badly the economy is performing. In 2009 the 
government finally abandoned the lunch it provided to more than 3.5 million workers and 
replaced it with a 15 pesos per week raise in wage, approximately $0.60.66 While a small 
raise relative to the U.S. dollar, the increase was rather significant since most Cuban workers 
received less than 500 pesos a month. The shift also foreshadowed a movement by the 
government to eliminate underperforming public services in favor of public sector growth. 
Although reports might not publically suggest the support of private entrepreneurship and 
many of the laws and taxes hamper private economic growth and employment, the 
fundamental shift expanded business opportunities for local restaurants that do not target 
tourists. 
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V. Prospects of Foreign Investment 
 
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Cuba has made various attempts to garner 
foreign direct investment in order to replace its largest trading partner, but for every 
promotional action it has made, the government has regressed and made investments riskier. 
The government tends to redo its foreign investment policy every 5-10 years, and it has 
exercised its prerogative in canceling partnerships after the initial contractual period finishes. 
For example, in 2002, Cuba had over 400 joint ventures with foreign entities, but by 2008, it 
retrenched and canceled contracts with half of the foreign corporations, citing a variety of 
reasons for the cancellations.67  In addition, when state enterprises feel threatened by the 
competition of foreign investment, they often exert influence over other enterprises, 
ultimately causing the joint venture’s electricity rates to spike, rent to be increased, and visas 
to be denied.68  If these issues are not enough to discourage investment, a comparison to the 
rest of South America illuminates other reasons to invest elsewhere. Cuba’s 2014 Foreign 
Investment Act requires a special approval process, which has been previously explained, yet 
none of the 14 Latin American countries surveyed by Investing Across Borders in 2010 have 
special hurdles for foreign investment.69  Additionally, these countries fully opened most of 
their economic sectors to foreign investment without limiting the equity arrangement of 
foreign entities; however, a few sectors like electricity, banking, and telecommunications 
were noted as areas that the governments are more likely to protect.70  This contrasts 
negatively with the rules and limitations that Cuba places on foreign investment.  Such 
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actions limit profit and diminish the incentives in investing. While the media has recently 
given great press coverage of the possibilities for American and other international 
corporations in Cuba, the articles fail to give an accurate picture of the volatile and secretive 
climate that shrouds foreign investments.  A relevant conclusion made by the Investing 
Across Borders 2010 study was that “Easily accessible and reliable information and efficient 
and predictable actions by public institutions help create a business environment conducive to 
investment.”71  This recommendation and conclusion helps recognize the need for strong 
social capital to attract foreign direct investment. A country that lacks international trust and 
that operates under a cloud of secrecy tends to foster an environment that is hostile to 
investment. As Cuba looks to expand the foreign investment on the island, it must work to 
compete with countries that offer investment relationships based on trust, adding another 
difficult impediment of economic growth.  
In The New Economy: What Roles for Foreign Investment?, Richard Feinberg 
attempts to assess the Cuban climate for foreign direct investment in 2012. First, Feinberg 
divides the past 50 years into 5 distinct periods of the government’s policies toward foreign 
direct investment: 1) revolutionary period of expropriation and nationalism; 2) the post-
Soviet phase of attracting FDI and liberalizing the economy; 3) a movement to return to a 
closed system through the cancellation of contracts; 4) a decision to create a “New 
Socialism” by focusing on attracting socialist countries to invest like Venezuela, China, and 
Brazil; and 5) an ambivalent period that is characterized by a transition away from historic 
models toward sweeping economic reforms.72  Categorizing these phases show a progression 
and regression of policies – continual shifts and counterbalances to change.  The 
government’s decisions reflect its desperation to maintain the revolutionary spirit of the 
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country and its pragmatism in times of need. The major questions that arise relate to what is 
next. Does the ambivalence change to complete acceptance of trade and liberalization? If so, 
would a reform of openness last, or would a period of retrenchment follow? Although future 
predictions of policy decisions requires some guesswork, the historic precedent and current 
attitude toward foreign investment allows for a consideration of what will occur next, 
acknowledging that a political transition might alter any current framework for assessment. In 
the face of this uncertainty, however, the Cuban economy is still severely underperforming: 
agriculture production is below 1988 levels, and national savings and investment only 
account for 10 percent of GDP, lagging the Latin American average by 10 percent.73 
Feinberg’s case study of 7 joint ventures in Cuba presents some of the advantages and 
disadvantages of foreign investment in Cuba.74  While the potential industries for investment 
are not surprising, the anecdotal examples reinforce common presuppositions. Tobacco, 
nickel, gas, tourism and agriculture are all areas that Cuba sought to improve its production 
and quality. Beginning in 1995, the government felt pressure to open up these areas of its 
economies in order to bring hard currency to the island. Minimizing imports and maximizing 
exports appears to be a consistent theme in Feinberg’s paper, and it highlights the 
government’s scrupulous approach to attracting partners who have a net positive impact on 
Cuba’s hard currency reserves. Almost every survey of foreign investments in Cuba critically 
evaluates the difficulties that are associated with the process. As Feinberg notes in the case 
studies he presents, the Cuban government consistently make business more difficult and 
uncertain, and they keep a sizeable portion of the profits through currency conversions and 
their joint stake.75 While businessmen are optimistic about a complete transition in Cuba and 
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the opening up for investment, the past should not be overlooked, and while the more intense 
example is the expropriation that occurred in the 1960s, Cuba still institutes policies that 
forces companies to give high percentages of their earnings to the government. One example 
of how Cuba accesses these earnings is through its method of collecting and then converting 
wages. The government receives payment of its workers in convertible pesos, but it pays 
them in local currency, which accounts for a 90 percent tax on labor.76  A study in 2000 by 
the United Nations found that the costs of Cuban workers in free trade zones were on average 
$1.75 an hour compared to the cheaper rate of workers in the Dominican Republic of $0.94 
per hour.77  This comparison reveals that foreign corporations paid an 85 percent premium for 
Cuban workers in contrast to workers in the Dominican Republic. This sizeable difference 
adds to policy changes that Cuba must endure to become a competitive market 
internationally.  
While expediency and efficiency have been addressed, in 2012, the Cuban 
government involved a multi-step process for foreign direct investment, which led to scrutiny 
by multiple government organizations. For the most part, it appears to be in place today; 
however, each business seems to have a different timeline in approval. First, the corporation 
must apply for a joint venture with a particular Cuban government agency, and second, the 
company must address approval from Ministry of International Commerce and Foreign 
Investment.78  This step will lead to consultation of the banking and finance branches of the 
government; in addition, a recommendation will then be made to the Executive Committee of 
the Council of Ministers. Finally, upon acceptance, the proposal will be put into action, but 
the timeline appears unclear. Although the law requires a 60-day response, the process can 
easily be prolonged because of the various obstacles in the formal procedures. Fortunately, 
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the new law has improved the transparency and possibility of acceptance by including over 
150 potential joint ventures. The new investment law technically allows for a completely 
private venture, but that has not yet occurred since its passage, reflective of the central 
government’s desire to influence and control all economic decisions.  
Cuba’s past 25 years have been characterized by economic crises and difficulties. 
However, as the Cuban government looks to transform the economy, it must be careful not to 
sacrifice the successes of the revolution along the way – chiefly the equity and 
socioeconomic improvements. As Vietnam has been seen as a model, examining the impact 
of the economic transformation on its society has a clear relation to Cuba’s future. A key 
characteristic of the Vietnamese transition related to its shift in policies from an equitable 
socialism to a market-driven liberalization, emblematic of this change was the reduction of 
the tariffs, which opened Vietnam up for investment: “By the mid-1980s tariff rates began to 
steadily fall, with the average at 85 percent, reaching 6 percent in 2002 and only 2 percent [in 
2014].”79 
To be clear, Vietnam followed a path of development that emphasized economic 
growth over social equity, contrary to the Cuban government’s stance on growth except 
emergent crises.80 Thus, as Cuba looks to the Vietnamese model, it should forecast the effect 
of some of the policy initiatives on social equity as the inequity in Vietnam skyrocketed after 
reforms. Concurrently, the agricultural production tripled in a period of two decades and the 
GDP increased 4 times over its 1980 value.81  Thus, the advantages of rapid economic growth 
must be weighed against the reality that if 4-5 percent growth rates are to occur as Cuban 
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economists project, the social equality of the state will most likely be an afterthought.  Omar 
Everleny’s perspective on Vietnam as a model for Cuba does not completely agree with this 
critique: “Vietnam has been able to introduce the market into its model and has become an 
economy with high rates of growth, improving the welfare of its citizens, and becoming a 
leader in world exports.”82 This analysis provides that the economic growth will be widely 
dispersed, leading to an improvement in the standard of living for most citizens.  However, 
current trends suggest that this might not be the case.  Newspapers already cover the rise of 
inequality in Cuba, connecting it to President Obama’s increase in remittances allowed 
annually and the Cuban government’s easement of restrictions against private enterprise.83  
As Cubans receive cash inflows from relatives in the United States, they have the opportunity 
to make strategic investments that are helping them become wealthy elites, and as this is 
happening, new tiers of classes are beginning to emerge.  Some level of equality may have to 




While Cuba faces crippling obstacles and some serious disadvantages, including a lack of 
trust, a poor national infrastructure, an abysmal technological grid, and a very low level of 
worker productivity, it has the ability to reform both its infrastructure and technology in the 
coming years, and as it opens its shores to the international community and transitions its 
leadership, some of these issues will diminish in their intensity.  In this context, a 
comprehensive study of the functions of the Cuban economy is critical as Cuba continues to 
develop and seek international investment. However, from this study, a few observations can 
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be made about the next steps of Cuba’s economic transition. A key comparative advantage 
Cuba possesses is its highly trained and educated population, combined with its investments 
in healthcare. Its human capital will promote investments by firms that need specialized 
labor, and as such, Cuba should continue to invest in higher education, while also working to 
attract these firms to the island. The government must continue its course to attract 
investment by acting as a better steward to corporations who apply for contracts. By 
eliminating the dual currency system, the government will reduce the tax it takes from wages, 
which will lead to a reduction in the cost of labor, making Cuba more competitive 
internationally. State-owned enterprises need to do a better job of welcoming foreign entities 
rather than discriminating against them, reducing the amount of unequal treatment. Moreover, 
the barriers should be eliminated in sectors the government does not have a vested interest in 
protecting. An example where high tariffs might be beneficial is agriculture, but at the same 
time, the government should offer tax incentives to local citizens who make the land more 
productive and profitable. When the embargo ends, Cuba should be wary of the United States 
influence, maintaining safeguards against dependency. While this might sacrifice growth, it 
will protect the country against a new wave of economic dependency, and through a 
thoughtful economic plan, Cuba will be in a better position to integrate into the world market.  
Social capital matters, and goodwill has a high intrinsic economic value. The next political 
leaders should be mindful of how their actions will be perceived by the international 
community because it will directly affect the levels of international investment. Another way 
of promoting better relations would be to switch dispute resolution to an international 
arbitrator for the next ten years in order to foster more international trust. Cuba must also 
manage its debt and find ways to settle old claims in order to integrate successfully into the 
global economy. If Vietnam is the model that the government follows, the equity and gains of 





both economically and politically; therefore, the decisions made by Cuban leaders today will 
have a major impact on the country that Cuba becomes.  
Anecdote 
During my time in Cuba, I spent a week on a cross-country tour of the island, and my 
academic cohort had a native Cuban guide that provided us with ample information about the 
politics, history, culture, and economy. While much of the tour seemed to be regurgitated 
facts, stories, and jokes, one of my exchanges with the guide captured what I believe to be an 
overwhelming sentiment on the island. The highways were in ill-repair, and while many 
developing nations have poorly constructed national infrastructures for transportation, Cuba’s 
neglect appeared to have gone on for over fifty years. When I probed the tour guide about 
how the government would finance the project of rebuilding, the answer was quick, 
seemingly unrehearsed: “Someone else will pay for it. We need another country to build 
these highways and fix our buildings. Cuba is broke. The government has no money to do it.” 
Cuba’s foreign debt echoes this statement, but the tour guide’s admission points to a more 
glaring critique on the Cuban society. For five hundred years, Cuba has been accustomed to 
receiving vast injections of foreign capital and investment. The revolution promised 
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